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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This Court has jurisdiction over the above entitled 
matter because it involves the interpretation of Rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellant brought an action in the District Court of 
the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County (the "State 
case") against the Appellee claiming legal malpractice 
was committed by the Appellee in handling a lawsuit for 
the Appellant against Chrysler Motor Corporation 
("Chrysler" herein), a case filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division 
and assigned to Judge David Sam, (the "Federal case"). 
The Federal case was settled at the pretrial conference 
and, thereafter, the Appellant refused to accept the 
agreed upon settlement, dismissed Appellee as his counsel 
and attempted to have the settlement agreement set aside. 
Appellant's efforts were futile in that Judge Sam refused 
to set the settlement aside, the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld Judge Sam's ruling and the United States 
Supreme Court denied Appellant's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari. 
After discovery in the State case was complete, 
Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was 
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granted and the Trial Court, sua sponte, imposed Rule 11 
sanctions upon Appellant and his attorney, jointly and 
severally, in the sum of $3,684.40 representing the costs 
and fees incurred by the Appellee in defending the claims 
brought against him by the Appellant in the State case. 
It is from the Order Granting Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the imposition of sanctions that the 
Appellant appeals. (Shortly after the Notice of Appeal 
was filed, Appellee and Appellant's attorney reached a 
compromise and settlement agreement, therefore, that 
matter is not before the Court.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Appellee contends that the Trial Court in the State 
case properly granted his Motion for Summary Judgment and 
imposed Rule 11 sanctions and submits that the issues 
raised herein are: 
1. Do the doctrines of res judicata or estoppel 
bar Appellant's claims in the State case? 
2. Was the sua sponte imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions by the Trial Court in the State case an abuse 
of discretion? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts material to the issues presented herein 
2 
are: 
1. In March of 1987, Appellant purchased a 1987 
Dodge van from Hinckley Dodge of Salt Lake City, Utah 
("Hinckley" herein) under a Retail Installment Contract. 
He neither put money down on the van nor made any 
payments under the contract. (R. 188 and 189) 
2. Appellant claimed that immediately after he 
took possession of the van, he discovered that the 
sliding door did not work properly and oil leaked from 
the engine in significant quantities. (R. 10 at paragraph 
10) 
3. Appellant contended that he made several 
demands on Hinckley to repair the van but Hinckley 
refused even though it was still under a 12,000 mile 
warranty. (R. 11 at paragraphs 11 & 12) 
4. Appellant took delivery of the van and returned 
it to Hinckley 18 days later, after driving it 5,000 
miles as a taxi. (R. 171) 
5. Appellant had no evidence to show Chrysler 
carelessly and negligently manufactured the van but 
claimed he sustained damages of $10,369, to wit: $80 for 
installation of a taxi meter, $289 for installation of a 
car phone and $10,000 for loss of business during the 
3 
year xys/. (R. 171) 
6. At a pretrial conference held in the Federal 
case, the parties reached a settlement and, on the 
record, counsel for Chrysler read the settlement terms to 
Judge Sam and to the Appellant, who agreed that the 
settlement terms as read were an accurate reflection of 
the agreement reached by the parties. (R. 44 - 47) 
7. Judge Sam, who presided over the pretrial 
settlement conference held in the Federal case, approved 
the settlement after questioning the Appellant to 
ascertain whether or not he understood and accepted its 
terms. (A transcript of Judge Sam's inquiry is set forth 
at R. 45 lines 16 thru 25) 
8. Thereafter, Appellant filed a Motion to Set 
Aside the Settlement Agreement and therein claimed, among 
other things, that Appellee committed malpractice and was 
negligent in not properly prosecuting the Federal case by 
neither seeking timely discovery nor filing affidavits in 
opposition to Chrysler's motions, in spite of Appellant's 
repeated demands and suggestions to do so. (R. 53 and 54) 
9. On January 12, 1990, Judge Sam denied 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Settlement Agreement. (R. 
50 - 56) 
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10. In so ruling, Judge Sam stated, in part, that 
"there is not a scintilla of evidence showing Niculescu 
experienced coercion or anything more than settler's 
remorse, the Court finds no reason to set aside what is 
an extremely generous settlement considering Niculescu, 
without paying Chrysler or Hinckley Dodge anything, but 
putting 5,000 miles on a van in three weeks and he 
offered only unsupported allegations concerning his claim 
for lost profits." Judge Sam further stated that the 
only reason Rule 11 sanctions were not imposed against 
Niculescu was because he appeared pro se. (R. 56) 
11. Thereafter, Appellant appealed the ruling of 
Judge Sam to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. 
12. On January 30, 1990, Appellant brought the 
State case claiming that Appellee committed malpractice 
(R. 5 Count I), was negligent (R. 6 Count II) and 
breached an implied covenant (R. 7 Count III) by not 
properly prosecuting the Federal case. 
13. On June 20, 1990, the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals confirmed Judge Sam's ruling. (R. 60) 
14. Thereafter, Appellant appealed the decision of 
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
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15. On October 15, 1990, Appellant accepted $2,500 
as full payment for the settlement in the Federal Case 
and signed a General Release. (R. 62) 
16. On February 19, 1991, the United States Supreme 
Court denied Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
in the Federal Case. (R. 63) 
17. Appellant persisted with the claim brought 
against the Appellee in the State case from January 1990 
to May 1991. 
18. The Trial Court ruled that the State case 
constituted a proceeding brought by the Appellant for the 
specific purpose of harassing and causing needless delay 
and increasing costs of litigation. (R. 166 paragraph 16) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
All claims made by the Appellant against the 
Appellee in the State case were made and ruled upon in 
the Federal case and are final. 
The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions by the Trial 
Court was not an abuse of discretion in that the express 
language of Rule 11 allows the Court to do what it did 
i.e. upon its own motion, order the Appellant to pay 
Appellee7s expenses incurred to defend the State case. 
6 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA OR ESTOPPEL BAR APPELLANT'S 
CLAIMS. 
As set forth in the summary of Appellee's argument, 
all claims made by the Appellant against the Appellee in 
the State case were made and ruled upon in the Federal 
case and are final. The Federal case initially involved 
Appellant's claims against Chrysler based on the alleged 
failure by Chrysler to honor its new car warranty on the 
1987 Dodge van purchased by Appellant from Hinckley. 
That claim was settled at a pretrial conference held 
before Judge Sam. Thereafter, the Appellant claimed that 
he should not be bound by the Settlement Agreement 
because 
1. The Appellant was dissatisfied with the 
Settlement Agreement after the fact; 
2. The settlement amount was not correct; 
3. Appellant entered into the agreement based upon 
Appellee's statement that if an agreement was not 
reached, Appellee would withdraw from further 
representation of Appellant; 
4. Appellee did not seek timely discovery or file 
affidavits in opposition to Chrysler's motions in spite 
of Appellant's repeated demands and suggestions to do so; 
7 
and, 
5. The written Settlement Agreement was 
inconsistent with the oral agreement made in court 
because it provided for the release of any claims 
Appellant had against Hinckley, a non party. 
These matters were considered by Judge Sam, who 
refused to set aside the Settlement Agreement, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, that upheld the ruling of Judge 
Sam, and the Supreme Court of the United States, that 
denied Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
After receiving Judge Sam's ruling, Appellant filed 
the State action against Appellee. Five months 
thereafter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed 
the ruling of Judge Sam and four months thereafter 
Appellant accepted the settlement check from Chrysler and 
signed a General Release but continued to pursue the 
State case. In February of 1991, the United States 
Supreme Court denied Appellant's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari but the Appellant continued to pursue the 
State case. 
In this factual setting, the Trial Court ruled that 
the issues raised by the Appellant in the State case had 
been previously raised and ruled upon in the Federal 
8 
case, that Judge Sam found the settlement in the Federal 
case was made voluntarily by the Appellant, therefore, 
the claims made by Appellant in the State case are barred 
by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Appellee contends that the rulings of the Trial 
Court are correct because 
1. When Appellant settled his claims against 
Chrysler in the Federal case, he compromised and settled 
all claims he had against Chrysler and Hinckley arising 
out of the sale of the van and waived any claim he had 
against Appellee for the manner in which he handled the 
federal case, 
2. When all of the courts in the Federal 
system rejected Appellant7s attempt to set the Federal 
case settlement aside for several reasons, one of which 
was that Appellant's negligence, the doctrine of res 
judicata or estoppel bar the the Appellant from raising 
the same claims in the State case and 
3. It is consistent with decisions on this 
subject rendered by Oregon in Sibold v. Sibold, 340 P.2d 
974 (1959); by California in Bell v. Towne, 318 P.2d 110 
(1958); by Nevada in Fitz Harris v. Phillips, 333 P.2d 
721 (1958); by Colorado in Public Services Co, of 
9 
Colorado v. Osmase Wood Preserving. 813 P.2d 785 (1991) 
and by Oklahoma in McKee v. Producers7 and Refiners' 
Corp.. 170 Okl. 559, 41 P.2d 466, the Annotation at 88 
A.L.R. 574 and 3 Okla. L. Rev. 104. 
The only real question presented by the facts herein 
is whether Appellant's claims are barred by the doctrine 
of a res judicata or the doctrine of estoppel. 
The doctrines of res judicata and estoppel are 
thoroughly discussed in Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U.S. 
351, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1897), the leading American case on 
the point. The following language of Mr. Justice Field 
has done much to clear up confusion that exists on the 
subject: 
There is a difference between the 
effect of a judgment as a bar or 
estoppel against the prosecution of 
a second action upon the same claim 
or demand, and the effect as an 
estoppel in another action between 
the same parties upon a different 
claim or case of action. In the 
former case, the judgment, if 
rendered upon the merits, 
constitutes an absolute bare to a 
subsequent action. It is a finality 
as to the claim or demand in 
controversy, concluding parties and 
those in privity with them, not only 
as to every matter which was offered 
and received to sustain or defeat 
the claim or demand, but as to any 
other admissible matter which might 
have been offered for that purpose. 
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* * * The language, therefore, which 
is so often used, that a judgment 
estops not only as to every ground 
of recovery or defense actually 
presented in the action, but also as 
to every ground which might have 
been presented, is strictly accurate 
when applied to the demand or claim 
in controversy. Such demand or 
claim, having passed into judgment, 
cannot again be brought into 
litigation between the parties in 
proceedings at law upon any ground 
whatever. But when the second 
action between the same parties is 
upon a different claim or demand, 
the judgment in the prior action 
operates as an estoppel only as to 
those matters in issue or points 
controverted, upon the determination 
of which the finding or verdict was 
rendered. In all cases, therefore, 
where it is sought to apply the 
estoppel of a judgment rendered upon 
one cause of action, to matters 
arising in a suit upon a different 
cause of action, the inquiry must 
always be as to the point or 
question actually litigated and 
determined in the original action, 
not what might have been thus 
litigated and determined. 
The Restatement of the law states that where a 
judgment of a previously tried case is claimed to 
preclude further litigation of the particular facts upon 
which the Court made findings the following must exist: 
Where causes of action are separate 
and different, and there is no true 
issue of res adjudicata involved, a 
judgment in one case will not 
operate as a bar of estoppel in 
11 
another, unless there has been a 
finding of a specific fact in the 
former judgment, that was 
controlling and material in that 
case# and is also controlling and 
material in the pending case. And, 
for such a judgment to operate as a 
bar of estoppel, it must also appear 
that the matter of fact was so in 
issue that it was necessarily 
determined in the former case. 
Restatement of the Law, Judgments, 
Section 68. 
Based upon this analysis, it appears that 
Appellant's claims in the State case were barred by 
estoppel. 
THE SUA SPONTE IMPOSITION OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS BY THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The Trial Court ruled that the State case 
constituted a proceeding brought by Appellant interposed 
for the specific purpose of harassing and causing 
needless delay and increasing the costs of litigation (R. 
166 paragraph 16) and determined that it was reasonable 
that sanctions be imposed against the Appellant for all 
costs and fees incurred by the Appellee in the defense of 
the State case. (R. 166 paragraph 17) 
The ruling of the Trial Court is consistent with the 
express language of Rule 11 which provides that the 
signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a 
12 
certification by him that the pleading has been read and 
is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law 
and not interposed for any improper purpose such as 
harassment, unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 
cost of litigation. The Rule then goes on to state 
If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose 
upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an 
appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because 
of the filing of the pleading, 
motion, or other paper, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
The record clearly shows that the only reason Judge 
Sam did not grant Rule 11 sanctions in the Federal case 
is because Appellant was acting pro se when he filed his 
Motion to Set Aside the Settlement. (R. 194 final 
paragraph) In the face of this warning, Appellant filed 
the State case to therein raise the same issues he 
presented in the Federal case. 
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is clear that 
the Appellant failed to show that the Trial Court abused 
it's discretion. 
13 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling of the Trial Court is supported by the 
record on appeal, the case law of many jurisdictions and 
the Supreme Court and by Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and, therefore, should ncjtbe disturbed. 
Respedtf ujk^/submitted
 # 
MAILING CERTIFK 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two 
copies of the foregoing to Adrian Michail Niculescu, Pro 
Se, 470 South 1300 East, #309, Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
this //r'day of May, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 
JOSEPH N. NEMELKA JR. No. 5326 
7001 South 900 East, Suite 210A 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
(801) 255-3979 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADRIAN NICULESCU, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
THOMAS BLONQUIST, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and for 
his causes of action against the Defendant hereby allege and 
complain of said Defendant as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and therefore alleges 
that the defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, is an attorney licensed to practice law in said State, and 
that all acts complained of herein occurred in said county and 
state. 
C O M P L A I N T 
civil NO. ^OO^OO^^QCKJ 
'udge: JUDGE P*T B. R ^ M 
000002 
JURISDICTION & VENUE 
3. The amount in controversy is in excess of Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000.00) exclusive of costs, 
4. Jurisdiction and venue are proper with the above-
entitled Court per Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-3-4 and 78-13-7. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. On or about July of 1987f the plaintiff and the 
defendant entered into an attorney/client relationship for the 
purpose of pursuing plaintiff's claims against Chrysler Motors 
Corporation forf inter aliaf Chrysler's breach of warranty, 
negligence, and breach of the warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose as they related to plaintiff's purchase of an 
automobile from Hinckley Dodge in Salt Lake City, an authorized 
dealer for said Chrysler Motors Corporation. 
6. The defendant accepted the sum of One Thousand Four 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,450) as a retainer for work to be done 
in connection with the action against Chrysler and allegedly 
entered into a contingency agreement with the plaintiff for an 
additional 50% of the amount recovered. 
7. On or about the 1st day of September, 1987, the 
defendant, on behalf of the plaintiff and in the representative 
capacity as his attorney, filed a four (4) page Complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Division, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and 
by this reference incorporated herein. 
( 2 ) 
8. In furtherance of the attorney/client relationship and 
in connection with the action filed against Chrysler, the 
defendant attended a pretrial scheduling conference on May 23, 
1988, wherein it was agreed that discovery was to be completed 
before November, 18, 1988 and that all interrogatories, requests, 
and demands must be submitted timely to comply with said 
completion date. 
9. Although Chrysler's attorney engaged in vigorous 
discovery, plaintiff is informed, believes, and therefore alleges 
that from the May 23 date to the November 18 date, the defendant 
did absolutely nothing in the way of discovery on behalf of the 
plaintiff, even though plaintiff had repeatedly informed the 
defendant there were original documents that needed to be 
obtained from Hinckley which were vital to this matter. 
10. On or about November 18, 1988, the last day by which 
discovery was to be completed as given in the pretrial order, the 
defendant allegedly submitted a First Request for Production of 
Documents, First Set of Interrogatories, and First Request for 
Admissions to Chrysler's attorney who thereafter filed a Motion 
to Strike said discovery as not being timely filed. 
11. To the best of plaintiff's knowledge Chrysler's 
motion was never heard and the matter went before the Court on a 
settlement conference where the following acts of the defendant, 
in addition to his failure to engage in any discovery prior to 
the Court imposed deadline, were in further violation of the 
( 3 ) 
attorney/client relationship which existed between the parties: 
(a) Defendant failed to properly advise the 
plaintiff and failed to adequately explain and disclose the 
material portions of the settlement agreement; 
(b) Defendant coerced the plaintiff into accepting 
the settlement agreement by threatening to withdraw as his 
attorney of record if he did not accept said settlement; and 
(c) The defendant included Chrysler's agentf 
Hinckley/ in the dismissal with prejudice even though Hinckley 
was not even a party to the law suit and even though the 
defendant knew or ought to have known that Hinckley had ruined 
plaintiff's credit and the settlement agreement precluded 
plaintiff from legally pursuing a valid claim against Hinckley. 
12. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and therefore 
alleges that the defendant, after his services were terminated 
by the plaintiff, executed the above referenced settlement 
agreement in direct contradiction to the instructions he had 
received from the plaintiff. 
COUNT I 
MALPRACTICE 
13. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 12 of this Complaint. 
14. The plaintiff relied on defendant's representations 
that by holding himself for hire to the general public, the 
defendant possessed the knowledge and skill common to members of 
( 4 ) 
his profession and that the defendant would use the care and 
diligence reasonably necessary to pursue the claim against 
Chrysler. 
15. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and therefore 
alleges that the defendant's actions complained of herein clearly 
fall below any reasonable standards within the State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, under his First Cause of Action, plaintiff 
prays for judgment against the defendant as follows: 
1. For General Damages in the sum of $247,500.00; 
2. For Compensatory Damages in the sum of $1,450.00; 
3. For reasonable attorney's fees for being required to 
bring this action, for costs of court; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper in the premises. 
COUNT II 
NEGLIGENCE 
16. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 12 of this Complaint. 
17. In connection with the attorney/client relationship, 
Defendant owed a duty to plaintiff to: 
(a) Reasonably and diligently pursue the law suit 
against Chrysler; 
(b) To properly advise the plaintiff as to the 
material aspects of the alleged settlement agreement; 
(c) To allow the plaintiff to make a voluntary and 
( 5 ) 000006 
and uncoerced decision with respect to the settlement 
agreement; and 
(d) To insure that plaintiff's future legal rights 
were protected. 
18. As heretofore alleged, defendant breached these 
duties to the plaintiff and as a direct and proximate cause of 
the defendant's actions, plaintiff has been damaged in that he 
is now precluded from pursuing his claim against Chrysler, has 
lost a significant amount of business, has suffered extreme 
damage to his credit, and has suffered severe emotional distress. 
WHEREFORE, under his Second Cause of Action Plaintiff 
prays for judgment against the Defendant as follows: 
1. For General Damages in the sum of $247,500.00; 
2. For Compensatory Damages in an amount to be determined 
at the time of trial in this matter but for not less $100,000.00; 
3. For reasonable attorney's fees, for costs of court, 
and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just 
and proper in the premises. 
COUNT III 
BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT 
19. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 12 of this Complaint. 
20. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and therefore 
alleges that in the attorney/client relationship previously 
existing between the parties there existed an implied covenant 
( 6 ) 
that the defendant would represent plaintiff's interests with 
competence and diligence. 
21. Plaintiff is further informed and therefore alleges 
that the defendant's conduct in connection with the law suit 
against Chrysler was neither competent nor done with diligence. 
22. That as a direct and proximate result of the 
defendant's breach of this implied covenant, plaintiff has been 
damaged in that he is precluded from pursuing his claim against 
Chrysler and Hinckley, has lost a significant amount of business, 
has suffered extreme damage to his business, all of which has 
caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress. 
WHEREFORE, under his Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff 
prays for judgment against the Defendant as follows: 
1. For General Damages in the sum of $247,500.00; 
2. For Compensatory Damages in an amount to be determined 
at the time of trial in this matter but for not less than 
$100,000.00; 
3. For Consequential Damages in an amount to be 
determined at the time of trial; 
4. For reasonable attorney's fees, for costs of court, 
and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just 
and proper in the premises. 
DATED this day of January, 1990. 
JOSEPH N. NEMELKA JR. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
'J0G908 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., A0369 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
ADRIAN NICULESCU, ) 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- ] 
CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, ! 
a Delaware corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
> COMPLAINT 
1 Civil No. 
Plaintiff complains of the defendant and alleges as 
follows: 
COUNT I 
1. Plaintiff is a resident and a citizen of the state 
of Utah and resides at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County. 
2. Defendant is a corporation and is incorporated in 
the state of Delaware with its principal place of business 
in New York City, New York and is authorized to do business 
in the State of Utah. 
3. The plaintiff claims jurisdiction of the above 
court pursuant to 28 USC Section 1332(a)(1) based upon the 
diversity of citizenship that exists between the plaintiff 
and the defendant. 
4. The amount in controversy exceeds the sum of 
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 
5. The plaintiff claims that the proper venue lies in 
the above court pursuant to 28 USC Section 1391(a) in that 
the matter arose in the Central Division of the above court 
and the acts and conduct of the defendant were perpetrated 
in said division and jurisdiction and that the plaintiff 
therein resides. 
6. During the month of March 1987, plaintiff obtained 
from Hinkley Dodge, an authorized dealer in the state of 
Utah for the defendant, a vehicle for use as a taxi. 
7. The vehicle that was purchased was a 1987 Dodge 
B150VAN, VIN 2b4HBllTlHK215745 and at the time of purchase 
defendant's authorized dealer was told and therefore knew 
that said van would be used by plaintiff as a taxi. 
8. After purchasing said vehicle plaintiff utilized 
the same as a taxi cab in Salt Lake County, state of Utah. 
9. Said vehicle was manufactured by the defendant and 
transported to the state of Utah for sale. 
10. Immediately after plaintiff's purchase of the said 
vehicle the door used to admit passengers would not function 
properly and the vehicle's engine leaked oil in significant 
amounts. 
11. Plaintiff returned the vehicle to defendant's 
authorized dealer in the state of Utah on a number of occa-
sions and in each instance requested that the needed repairs 
be made and was informed that the door could not be fixed 
and the oil leak could be cured by putting an additive in 
the motor oil. 
12. There was on the part of the defendant's 
authorized dealer a complete failure to attempt repairs even 
though the vehicle was under warranty i.e. it had been 
driven less than 12,000 miles and had been purchased within 
twelve (12) months. 
13. Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff avers that the 
vehicle was not fit for its intended purpose and as a result 
that he was unable to use the vehicle for a taxi resulting 
in financial loss to his business in the sum of $250,000. 
COUNT II 
14. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by 
reference hereat paragraphs 1 through 11 of plaintiff's 
complaint. 
15. Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff alleges that 
defendant failed to abide by its written warranty and as a 
result thereof the defendant has been damaged in the sum of 
$250,000. 
COUNT III 
16. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by 
reference hereat paragraphs 1 through 11 of plaintiff's 
complaint. 
17. Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff alleges that 
said vehicle was carelessly and negligently manufactured by 
defendant. 
18. As a direct, proximate and legal result of the 
negligence of the defendant, plaintiff has been damaged in 
the sum of $250,000. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $250,000 together with his costs in-
curred herein and such other and further relief as the court 
deems just in the premises. 
Dated this j/ ~ day of August, 1987. 
Plaintiff's Address: 
P.O. Box 2557 
S.L. C , Utah 84110 
Thomas, JR. Bltmquist 
N 
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M 1 9 1991 
( I ^Huty Clerk 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369 \J 
Pro Se 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADRIAN NICULESCU ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. ] 
THOMAS BLONQUIST, ] 
Defendant. ] 
| FINDINGS OF FACT 
and CONCLUSIONS OF 
| Case No. 900900580 
I Judge Pat B. Brian 
LAW 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing before the above entitled court at 8:30 a.m. on Monday, the 
29th day of April, 1991. Plaintiff was present with his attorney 
of record, Joseph M. Nemelka, Jr., and the Defendant was present, 
pro se. The Court heard and considered the statements and 
arguments of counsel, read the pleadings in support of and in 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and read and 
considered all of the other pleadings on file herein and, 
thereupon, took the matter under advisement. 
Court was reconvened on Friday the 3rd day of May, 1991 at 
8:30 a.m. and the Court indicated that after having taken the 
matter under advisement and thoroughly reviewing all material 
submitted by the parties and duly considering the same, he was 
prepared to make and enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is an attorney at law. 
2. The Plaintiff participated in a five hour settlement 
conference in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah on January 13, 1989 in the case of Adrian Niculescu v. 
Chrysler Motor Company, No 87C0770S, the "Federal case" herein. 
3. Plaintiff was represented in the Federal case by 
Defendant above named, Thomas R. Blonquist, who is a member in good 
standing of the Utah State Bar. 
4. Plaintiff freely, knowingly and intelligently entered 
into and signed a settlement agreement in the Federal case as a 
result of the said five hour settlement conference. 
5. On January 30, 1990, Plaintiff brought the above entitled 
action against the Defendant for legal malpractice. 
6. On October 15, 1990, Plaintiff accepted $2,500 as full 
payment for the settlement in the Federal case and signed a General 
Release. See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
7. On January 12, 1990, Judge David Sam, the judge presiding 
over the Federal case, denied Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the 
Settlement Agreement. See Exhibit "B" attached hereto. 
8. In so ruling, Judge Sam stated in part that "there is not 
a scintilla of evidence showing Plaintiff Niculescu experienced 
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coercion or anything more that settler's remorse in what was an 
extremely generous settlement, wherein Plaintiff put 5,000 miles on 
a van purchased from Hinckley Dodge, without paying one dollar for 
said van." Judge Sam stated further, "The only reason Rule 11 
sanctions were not imposed against Niculescu is because he was 
appearing pro se." 
9. Thereafter, Plaintiff appealed the ruling of Judge Sam to 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
10. On June 20, 1990 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the ruling of Judge Sam. See Exhibit "C" attached hereto. 
11. Thereafter, Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals to the United States Supreme Court. 
12. On February 19, 1991, the United States Supreme Court 
denied Plaintiff's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. See Exhibit 
11D" attached hereto. 
13. Plaintiff has persisted with the claims brought against 
the Defendant in the above entitled matter from July 1990 to May 
1991. 
14. The Court, sua sponte, finds as follows: 
a. Counsel for the Plaintiff has violated Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that the signature of an attorney 
constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, 
motion or other paper, that, to the best of his knowledge, 
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information and belief formed, after reasonable inquiry, that it is 
well founded in fact and warranted by existing law. 
b. The above entitled action brought by the Plaintiff 
against the Defendant violates the provisions of Rule 11. 
c. The above entitled matter constitutes a proceeding 
brought by the Plaintiff interposed for the specific purpose of 
harassing and causing needless delay and increasing in the costs of 
litigation. 
d. It is reasonable that sanctions be imposed against 
Plaintiff's counsel and the Plaintiff, jointly and severally, for 
all costs and fees incurred by the Defendant in the defense of the 
above entitled action. 
e. It is reasonable that the Defendant submit an affidavit 
setting forth all costs and fees incurred in the defense of this 
matter. 
f. It is reasonable that the Plaintiff and his attorney, 
jointly and severally, be required to pay said fees and costs in 
full on or before June 1, 1991. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The decisions of the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United 
4 
States Supreme Court are the final dispositive law of the case and 
their decisions are res judicata in the above entitled matter. 
2. There are no genuine issues of material fact in the above 
entitled case and Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment as a 
matter of law. 
3. Good cause exist for Plaintiffs counsel to be sanctioned 
for violating Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and for 
the Plaintiff and his attorney, jointly and severally, to be 
ordered to pay all costs and fees incurred by the Defendant in the 
defense of the above entitled action. 
DATED this I *7 day of June, 1991. 
BY THE COURQ 
V _ 
Pat B. Brian 
Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to: Joseph N. Nemelka, Jr., Attorney 
at Law, 7001 South 900 East, Suite 210 A, Midvale, UT 84047 this 
-ft ^  day of June, 1991. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
mroT8R 
dZfezi* ft? £/of*7$ 
GENERAL RELEASE 
In consideration for the payment of Two Thousand Five Hundred 
and No/100 Dollars ($2,500.00) payable to Adrian Niculescu, receipt 
of which is acknowledged by Adrian Niculescu (hereinafter the 
"undersigned") , the undersigned hereby releases and forever 
discharges Chrysler Motors Corporation, Inc. and Hinckley Dodge, 
Inc., their agents, principals, servants, employees, affiliates, 
predecessors in interest, successors in interest, subsidiary and 
parent corporations (hereinafter referred to as "released parties"), 
from any and all claims, losses, demands, damages, actions, causes 
of action, or suits of whatever kind or nature which now exist or 
which may hereafter accrue, because of, for, arising out of, or in 
any way connected with the purchase, use, condition, repairs, 
merchantability or warranties of a 1987 Dodge B150 Van, Serial No. 
2B4HB11T1HK215745, the details of which are more fully set forth in 
the files and records of the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Central Division, in that certain action entitled, 
Adrian Niculescu v. Chrysler Motors Corporation Civil No. 87C-
0770S. 
This is a general and complete release of all claims against 
the released parties and includes, but is not limited to, claims for 
personal injuries, property damage, claims for loss of income, 
contribution, breach of contract, emotional distress, indemnity, 
attorney's fees, permanent injury, costs of litigation and all other 
claims of any kind or character. It is also the express intent of 
0 
the undersigned to this general release to relieve the released 
parties of any and all liability for indemnity, contribution or for 
attorney's fees arising from or pertaining to the incident above-
described. 
It is further understood and agreed that this settlement is 
the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and that payment is 
not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the 
released parties, by whom liability is expressly denied. The 
undersigned represents and warrants that in entering into this 
release that he has had the opportunity for independent legal advice 
and is not relying upon any claims, representations pr advices from 
any representative of any party hereby released. 
-j&kj^^- (W. oJMS ;ao 
ADRIAN NICULESCU y-An 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) 
) s s . 
) 
On the /r« day of -rJanuerry"; T9B9^ f p e r s o n a l l y appeared 
befor^jnae Adrj.an^^N^culescu, t h e s i gne r of t h e foregoing genera l 
re]?5g^ t o me t h a t he executed t he same, 
i ^ S S ^ & W ROBERT KUUtDEH • 
8aftUk«Clty, Utah 84101 J 
My Comrolwton E*pta* I 
May 16,1993 | 
State of Utah I 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
H /^ /<?<?! 
JCAU, J<£. ?£ 
NOT/IKi PUBLIC in and for the 
State of Utah, residing at 
~7 
/<^o 
-2- 000187 
EXHIBIT "B" 
^K*0t88-
90 ,-Myi-
8 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT^ FtfR THE DISTpiCT^OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION TmiliC - P^ 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * tlf\f} 9/*K)ft'j* * * * 
ADRIAN NICULE5CU, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant, 
^^^UHOBLiEi 
R U L I N G 
Case No. 87-C-0770-S 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This action is before the court on plaintiff Adrian 
Niculescu's motion to set aside settlement agreement and the 
motions of defendant Chrysler Motors Corporation (Chrysler) to 
enforce settlement agreement and for Fed. R. Civ, P, 11 sanctions, 
1. Facts 
On March 11, 1987 plaintiff Niculescu purchased a 1907 van 
from Hinckley Dodge, Inc. (Hinckley) under a Retail Installment 
Contract and took possession of it two days later. Hinckley 
purchased the van (for use as a taxi cab) from Lay ton Hills 
Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge. Niculescu neither put any money down on 
the van nor paid anything for its purchase or delivery. He alleges 
that immediately after he took possession of the van, he discovered 
the door did not work and the oil leaked in ^significant 
quantities • " Niculescu further alleges he made several demands on 
Hinckley to repair the van (Hinckley says it first heard from him 
on March 25 or 26) but Hinckley refused even though the van was 
still under a 12,000 mile warranty. On March 31, 1987, only 18 
days after taking the van (during which timejie used it as a taxi), 
Niculescu returned the van to Hinckley with 5,000 miles on it. 
Niculescu, a full-time taxi driver since 1983, bought the van only 
after he shopped extensively at other dealerships, comparing 
prices, interest rates and features. He admitted he had no 
evidence to show Chrysler carelessly and negligently manufactured 
the van; however, he claimed his damages were $10,369.00: $80.00 
for installation of the taxi meter; $289 for installation of a car 
phone; and $10,000 for loss of business during 1987. 
The parties settled the action. On the record, counsel for 
Chrysler read the settlement agreement and Niculescu as well as his 
counsel, Tom Blonquist, agreed it accurately reflected the result 
of the settlement negotiations. 
MR. WALDBILLING (Counsel lor Chrysler): The 
settlement that has been reached is that Chrysler Motor 
Corporation will pay Adrian Niculescu by check made 
2 
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payable to him and his counsel, Tom Blonquist, in the 
amount of $2500 in return for a full and general release 
of Chrysler Motor Corporation, Hinckley Dodge and all of 
their agents and employees, predecessor corporation, et 
cetera, from any and all claims, causes of action or 
anything else arising from the plaintiff's purchase, use 
or anything else arising from his possession of the 1987 
Dodge B 110 van. 
And the case will be dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits. 
Tr. 3. The following colloquy then ensued: 
THE COURT: That is correct, Mr- Bloomquist [sic]? 
MR. BLOOMQUIST: Even though Hinckley is not a party 
to this lawsuit, Your Honor. 
MR. BLOOMQUIST: It is our understanding that this 
settlement will be inclusive of Hinkley [sic], correct? 
MR. NICULESCU: Yes. 
Id. The court approved the settlement after questioning lliculoscu 
to ascertain he understood and accepted the terms of the agreement. 
Id. at 3-4. 
Blonquist later signed the General Release and Stipulation of 
Dismissal and sent it to Chrysler in exchange for a check. 
Chrysler requested Mark Besendorfer, Niculescu's new counsel, to 
complete'the settlement agreement, but Niculescu refused to sign 
it. saying the terms (identical to those read into the record) were 
3 
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broader than those to which he agreed. Niculescu prepared his own 
"Release" that differs from the settlement agreement only in scope: 
he expressly seeks to (1) limit his release to the breach of the 
warranty and merchantability claims against Chrysler and (2) 
reserve his claims against 
any individuals and entities, agents, principals, 
servants, subsidiary or parent corporation including, but 
not limited to, claims he may have for damage to his 
credit occasioned by Chrysler Credit Corporation, 
Hinckley Dodge, Inc., or any other parties whether or not 
now known to [him] and all consequent damages, lost 
income, attorney's fees or other damages which may have 
occurred or may occur in the future and all other claims 
of any kind or character. 
Niculescu's Release dated July 28, 1988. Chrysler rejects the 
release as being contrary to the settlement and completely 
unacceptable. 
In his motion to set aside the settlement agreement Niculescu 
claims (1) he told Blonquist he was dissatisfied with the 
settlement agreement almost immediately after it was reached and 
communicated his dissatisfaction to him several times in letters; 
(2) the settlement amount was not correct because the copy of a 
Hinckley service invoice attached to Niculescufs deposition was not 
a true and correct copy of the original document and the difference 
between the original document and the purported copy was material 
to Niculescufs claim; (3) Niculescu entered into the agreement 
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partiiy as a result: or tJionquist' s statement that if an agreement 
was not reached, Blonquist would withdraw from further represen-
tation on behalf of Hiculescu; (4) Blonquist did not seek timely 
discovery or file affidavits in opposition to Chrysler's motions 
in spite of Hiculescufs repeated demands and suggestions to do so; 
and (5) the proposed settlement agreement is inconsistent with the 
oral agreement in court because it provides for a release of all 
claims Hiculescu may have against Hinckley, where that was not 
agreed to and where Hinckley v/as not a party to the action. 
Chrysler argues the settlement agreement should be enforced 
because (1) the settlement was agreed to on the record; (2) the 
court approved the settlement; and (3) counsel for both parties 
signed the General Release and Stipulation of Dismissal. Chrysler 
further argues it is entitled to attorneys1 fees and costs under 
Rule 11, because Hiculescu1s motion to set aside the agreement has 
Ho basis in law or fact. 
II. Discussion 
The test for determining whether a party has a right to 
challenge a settlement agreement is "voluntariness.11 The court 
should examine all factors surrounding the acceptance of the 
5 000132 
settlement agreement to determine whether it was entered 
voluntarily or was a result of coercion. Trans-Sterling, Inc. v. 
Bible, 798 F.2d 474 (Em. App. 1986); Willard v. City of Los 
Angeles, 803 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1986). 
Here, the sole significant difference between the original 
settlement agreement and Niculescu1s Release is that the original 
dismissed with prejudice all claims against^Chrysler, Hinckley "and 
all of their agents and employees, predecessor corporation, et 
cetera11 while Niculescufs Release would preserve those very claims. 
Clearly Niculescu1s Release directly contradicts the parties1 
settlement agreement. Blonquist specifically told the court 
Niculescu agreed to release the claims against Hinckley Dodge, even 
though Hinckley was not a party to the suit, and Niculescu affirmed 
not only that statement, but Chrysler's explanation of the 
settlement agreement. 
Because there is not a scintilla of evidence showing Niculescu 
experienced coercion or anything more than settler's remorse, the 
court finds no reason to set aside what is an extremely generous 
The court rejects as unsubstantiated and insufficient 
Niculescu1s assertion he agreed to the settlement only under threat 
Blonquist wouLd withdraw as counsel. 
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settlement considering Niculescu, without paying Chrysler or 
Hinckley Dodge anything, put 5,000 miles on the van in three weeks 
and he offered only unsupported allegations concerning his claim 
for lost profits. Moreover, the court agrees with Chrysler that 
the nearly unlimited language concerning potential claims against 
Chrysler affiliates violates the core of the settlement agreement 
to which Niculescu gave his unqualified assent in open court. 
Accordingly, the court denies Niculescufs motion to set aside 
and'grants Chrysler's motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 
Because Niculescu was acting pro se when he filed his motion to set 
aside, the court will not grant Rule 11 sanctions. 
DATED this /XK day of ., 192t£. 
BY THE COURT: 
counsel: l/16/90sm 
k A. Besendorfer 
nor M. Waldbillig, Esq. 
DAVID SAM 
U.S. District Judge 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
ADRIAN NICULESCU, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
F I L E D 
United States Court of Appeals 
Tenth Circuit 
JUfl2 0l!?90 
.OBERT L HOECKER 
Clerk 
No. 90-4018 
(D.C. No. 87-C-770S) 
(D. Utah) 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges. ** 
Plaintiff-appellant, Adrian Niculescu, appeals from the 
district court's denial of his motion to set aside a settlement 
agreement with defendant-appellee, Chrysler Motors. Although 
Miculescu agreed to the settlement in open court, he nov; proffers 
a bevy of reasons whv hp should not be held to his bargain, none 
of which are convincing. Chrysler's counsel read the settlement 
agreement into the record. Appellee's Brief Addendum D, at 2-3. 
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 
not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 
except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of ttie law of 
the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 
36.3. 
/;* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 
lias determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 
submitted without oral argument. 
000135 
The court then asked Niculescu whether he understood the 
settlement and accepted it. Niculescu answered affirmatively: 
THE COURT: Mr, Niculescu, let me just ask you three 
questions. One, did you hear what counsel has stated 
regarding this settlement? 
MR. NICULESCU: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And did you understand what you will receive 
as a settlement? 
MR. NICULESCU: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you accept that as the settlement? 
MR. NICULESCU: Yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. The settlement'* is approved by 
the Court. 
Id. at 3-4. Because we find no basis in the record for setting 
aside the settlement agreement between Niculescu and Chrysler 
Motors, we affirm the judgment of the district court substantially 
for the reasons stated in its order of January 12, 1990, a copy of 
which is attached hereto. 
AFFIRMED. 
Entered for the Court 
obby R. Baldock 
ircuit Judge 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 2 0 5 4 3 
ebruary 19, 1991 
Mr. Gainer M. Waldblllig 
Clark Learning Bdlg., Ste. 510 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Re: Adrian Niculescu 
v. Chrysler Motors Corporation 
No. 90-6399 
Dear Mr. Waldblllig: 
The Court today entered the following order in the a 
entitled case: 
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 
Very truly yours, 
Uilliam K. Suter, Clerk 
000197 
iyili;IS|ilJ 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369 
Pro Se 
40 South f><"••!; i:a'it-
Salt Lake ^.sty, Utah 84102 
Telephone srn1 533-0525 
JUN 1 9 mn| 
U 
n{*p«svC!«r;; 
)ISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
P] ai nti f f, 
v. 
THOMAS BLOW 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT L
 -.V"i 
Case Ho. 900900580 
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